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A security evaluation against the finite-key-size effect was performed for a commercial plug-and-
play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. We demonstrate the ability of an eavesdropper to
force the system to distill key from a smaller length of sifted-key. We also derive a key-rate equation
that is specific for this system. This equation provides bounds above the upper bound of secure
key under finite-key-size analysis. From this equation and our experimental data, we show that
the keys that have been distilled from the smaller sifted-key size fall above our bound. Thus, their
security is not covered by finite-key-size analysis. Experimentally, we could consistently force the
system to generate the key outside of the bound. We also test manufacturer’s software update.
Although all the keys after the patch fall under our bound, their security cannot be guaranteed
under this analysis. Our methodology can be used for security certification and standardization of
QKD systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are ex-
pected to provide unconditionally secure keys between
two parties [1–6]. To fulfill that expectation, every fea-
ture, imperfection, and loophole both in theory and prac-
tice has to be taken into account. One of these features
is that, with limited resources and time, a QKD system
can exchange only a finite length of raw key. The knowl-
edge of an adversary about the key is estimated by the
number of errors in it [7, 8]. Since the bound on the
adversary’s knowledge is estimated from a finite sample,
the smaller the sample is, the less accurate the estimate
becomes. Thus, the estimated knowledge might deviate
from the actual value and, if it is underestimated, the
security of the secret key might be compromised. Finite-
key-size analysis [9–14] takes these statistical deviations
into account and modifies the key-rate equation accord-
ingly.
Many of the practical QKD systems used today were
developed before the finite-key-size analysis in QKD pro-
tocols became available. Although some form of finite-
key-size effect has been considered in the literature since
the year 2000 [4], a rigorous proof was first published
in 2005 and developed in the subsequent years [9–14].
While the finite-size analysis was not considered in the
security assumptions of the early systems, the generated
secret key may still be secure if the raw-key sample size
is large enough to neglect the finite-size effects. However,
if the sample size is smaller, the effects can no longer be
neglected and an absence of the finite-key analysis may
render the generated key insecure. This is the main fo-
cus of this work. We emphasize the significance of the
finite-key-size effects in a practical QKD system. We also
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FIG. 1. Scheme of experiment.
demonstrate the ability of an eavesdropper to amplify
these effects by actively interfering with the transmis-
sion and forcing the system to generate secret key from
a smaller sample size. In Section II, we experimentally
demonstrate a simple attack that forces a commercial
QKD system to use a smaller sample size. The key-rate
equation for this specific system is derived in Section III.
In Section IV, we compare the finite-key security bounds
with our experimental data. We test the system again
after manufacturer’s security update in Section V, and
conclude in Section VI.
II. EXPERIMENT
The subject of this study is the security of a plug-
and-play QKD system Clavis2 produced by ID Quantique
[15, 16]. Although updated configurations for plug-and-
play systems exist [17], we have not modified the system
under test and all tests were performed in the same con-
figuration, as provided by the manufacturer. The QKD
protocol under study is Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol without decoy states [1, 7], as implemented in
Clavis2. The security of this system implemented in the
manufacturer’s software is based on the security anal-
ysis in Ref. 18, which is an analysis against photon-
number-splitting attack and cloning attack. The analysis
in Ref. 18 neither considers the finite-key-size effects nor
takes into account the lack of phase randomization in the
system. It also assume that Eve cannot change detectors
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FIG. 2. Secret-key size versus sifted-key size. Black × are experimental results with (a) 2 dB line loss and 2.5% error rate
averaged over all sessions, (b) 3 dB line loss with 5.2% error rate, and (c) 4 dB line loss with 6.2% error rate. The experiment
error rate in individual sessions deviated less than ±0.5% from the average. Blue (dark grey) curve is the infinite-key bound
obtained from Eq. (6). Red (grey) curve is a finite-key-size bound with ε = 10−10 using Eq. (5). Green (light grey) curve
is the finite-key-size bound with ε = 10−1. Secure-key bounds in each sub-figure were calculated separately according to the
error rate and line loss of each experiment. Experimental points that lie above each line are considered insecure under those
conditions used in each calculation. The detector’s efficiency during the experiment was 0.08. The dark count rate was 2×10−5
counts per second for each detector.
efficiency.
Under normal operation, the system exchanges the
quantum signals until the memory buffer for the states
sent by Alice is filled. This leads to the raw-key size be-
ing limited. This limit varies depending on the line loss
(at higher loss fewer photons are received by Bob, and
the key is smaller as our experimental data show below).
Then, Alice and Bob perform post-processing: sifting, er-
ror correction, and privacy amplification [7, 15, 16]. One
of the features of Clavis2 is that the system terminates
the raw-key exchange process if Bob’s photon detection
efficiency drops below a certain threshold, and performs a
recalibration procedure for the timing alignment of detec-
tor gates [16, 19]. This timing alignment greatly affects
the photon detection efficiency, is sensitive to environ-
mental fluctuations, and needs to be restored from time
to time by performing this recalibration. However the
system does not discard the raw key already accumu-
lated in the buffer (as long as it has accumulated at least
80 kbit), and performs the post-processing from the avail-
able amount at the time of termination. Eve may take
an advantage of this feature. Since the security proof of
the system did not take into account the statistical de-
viation due to non-infinite key length, the deviation can
be further amplified if the interruption for recalibration
occurs early in the raw-key exchange session.
To demonstrate Eve’s ability to force the system to dis-
till from a short raw-key length, we first ran the system in
a normal operation mode. The quantum channel between
Alice and Bob consisted of a 2 m long optical fiber, and
a variable attenuator (OZ Optics DD-100-11-1550) was
added to simulate transmission line loss of 2, 3 and 4 dB
(see Fig. 1). We ran multiple sessions of key distribution.
In each session, during the raw-key exchange phase, we
let the system exchange quantum signals for time τ , then
abruptly increased the attenuation to ≈ 40 dB. This
reduced the detection rate in Bob below the threshold
and forced the system to terminate the key exchange.
After that, the system performed post-processing of the
already exchanged raw key and reported the secret-key
length for that session. At the same time, we reset the
variable attenuator to the original loss value. The system
then recalibrated the timing alignment, and proceeded to
the next raw-key exchange session. We varied τ between
10–280 s, so that the raw-key size after termination was
between the system’s minimum threshold of 80 kbit and
the memory buffer limit of 1.6–4 Mbit in Bob (depending
on the line loss), corresponding to the leftmost and right-
most experimental points in each plot in Fig. 2. We also
allowed the system to complete some of the sessions natu-
rally without Eve’s intervention, which mostly resulted in
the maximum key length but occasionally a shorter one.
The plots show the variation of secret-key size as a func-
tion of the sifted-key size, for different transmission loss
values. Note that the sifted-key size plotted is half the
raw-key size. The amount of the raw key exchanged did
not depend solely on τ . Some sessions experienced fluc-
tuations in transmission loss and detection rate, which
caused a lower key exchange rate but not below the ter-
mination threshold. Some sessions terminated before we
induced the loss, when the detection efficiency dropped
below the threshold as the result of naturally occurring
timing drift, without Eve’s help.
In our analysis, we consider the length of secret key
as a function of the sifted-key length, rather than the
session time duration. For each session that produced
non-zero secret key, we recorded the length of the sifted
key, the number of bits disclosed in the error correction,
the error rate, and the length of the secret key reported
by the system. The system under test did not include
3finite-key-size analysis in its post-processing. Rather,
the post-processing step was programmed to subtract an
arbitrarily chosen amount of the key in addition to the
value given by the asymptotic security analysis [20]. This
subtraction was done to account for any unknown effects
that were not included in the system’s security analysis.
Prior to this study, the security of this arbitrary key sub-
traction has not been verified. We check this hypothesis
below. Note that we consider only the case where Eve
attempts to control the sifted-key-size before the post-
processing. No other attack or flaw is considered in this
study.
III. DERIVATION OF KEY-RATE EQUATION
For finite-key-size effects, we need to formulate the key-
rate equation for this specific system. To our knowledge,
there is no finite-key-size analysis that covers all assump-
tion in this system without hardware modification [21].
In this section, we use available derivation technique to
find a secure key bound of the key generated by the sys-
tem. We assume here that Eve does not interfere with
the bright pulses sent from Bob to Alice, and assume that
the phase of signal in different time slots is random. As a
result, the key bound in this analysis would lie above the
upper bound of secure key, which takes into account the
lack of phase randomization [22]. Although we cannot
conclude that the keys below our bound are secure, it
can be used to justify that the secret keys that fall above
this bound are not covered by the finite-key-size analysis.
Thus, we need to assume the worst case that such keys
are insecure.
Our analysis covers the process starting with the raw-
key exchange step of plug-and-play system, where Alice
attenuates the laser pulses from Bob and encodes each
pulse in one of the four possible phase values: 0, pi/2,
pi, and 3pi/2. Alice then sends the encoded signal back
to Bob where he measures the signal in one of the two
bases, and gets his raw key. They perform sifting and
error correction afterwards. The system then performs
privacy amplification process where the key is shortened
with a universal-2 hash function to exclude Eve’s infor-
mation about the key. The key after this step is the secret
key. Eve’s information is estimated from quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) found during the error correction and
probability of having multi-photon pulses during raw key
exchange. This process allows us to use a common pro-
cedure of secret-key analysis based on Refs. 9–11, which
stated that, by using the universal-2 hash function as
privacy amplification, a secret key K of secret key prob-
ability per bit lK is ε-secure if the protocol is not aborted,
and lK satisfies the relation
εPA < 2
− 12 (Hmin(K|E′)−lK). (1)
Here εPA is the collision probability of hash function,
which is the probability of two different input strings be-
ing projected into the same string of output. Hmin(K|E′)
is smooth min-entropy of the system, which represents
the probability of Eve guessing the key K correctly using
an optimal strategy, given her information about the key
before privacy amplification E′.
The goal of this derivation is to replace the smooth
min-entropy with a function of measurable parameters
from the system. Since the information leakage during
error correction is independent of other processes prior to
that, E′ can be decomposed into Eve’s knowledge before
error correction E and information leakage during error
correction process L. By inequality of smooth entropy
[11], we have
Hmin(K|E′) ≥ Hmin(K|E′′)− L− 7
√
1
n
log2
2
ε˜
, (2)
where Hmin(K|E′′) is the smooth min-entropy of the sys-
tem before the error correction step. The last term is a
statistical correction under finite-key-size regime, where
ε˜ is the probability that Eve’s information is underesti-
mated when using smooth min-entropy [12]. The analysis
in Refs. 12 and 23 gave us the bound of Hmin(K|E′′) as
a function of measurable parameters
Hmin(K|E′′) ≥ A
(
1− h
(
E˜
A
))
, (3)
where h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x)
is the binary Shannon entropy, E˜ = E +
1
2
√{2 ln(1/εPE) + 2 ln(n+ 1)}(1/n) takes into ac-
count a chance that the error rate estimated from a
sifted key of size n in the protocol might deviate from the
actual value [12], εPE is the probability that such devia-
tion occurs, and E is the observed error rate. The single
photon detection probability A = (pdet − pmulti)/pdet
is a correction term for weak coherent laser used to
exchange the raw key in the system [5], where pdet is the
probability of detection and pmulti is the probability of a
multi-photon pulse generated by Alice [16].
Now we consider information leakage during the error
correction. In theory, the minimum portion of the key
with error probability E that needs to be disclosed to
correct all the errors is h(E). Using this limit along with
the finite-key-size analysis from Ref. 13, we have the up-
per bound of information leakage during error correction
L ≤ leakECA+ log2
8
εEC
, (4)
where leakEC = fECh(E) is an estimated portion of
the key disclosed during error correction. The factor
fEC = 1.2 is a practical efficiency of the error correction
protocol [8, 12]. In the system log of system under test,
this value varied between 1.1–1.3. The last term takes
account of a failure probability εEC that the error cor-
rection leaves non-zero number of errors [13]. This can
occur, for example, owing to a non-zero probability of
at least one parity check block containing an even num-
ber of error bits in every iteration of CASCADE error-
correction code and the following parity check rounds in
Clavis2 [16].
4Since the experimental results are the secret key size
as a function of the sifted key length n, we need a secure
key bound l = nlK . Substituting Eqs. (2) to (4) into
Eq. (1), taking the logarithm, then multiplying by n on
both sides, we obtain
l ≤ nA
(
1− h
(
E˜
A
))
− n leakEC
− 7n
√
1
n
log2
2
ε˜
− 2 log2
1
εPA
− log2
2
εEC
,
(5)
with security parameter ε = εPE + ε˜+ εPA + εEC [11–14].
Since secret-key-rate analyses under collective and coher-
ent attack on non-decoy state BB84 are equivalent [6, 24],
the present analysis also covers coherent attack, which is
the most general form of attacks on QKD system.
The asymptotic key-rate equation for this specific sys-
tem can be derived in the same way, but without consid-
ering statistical deviation due to finite-size effects. The
asymptotic key-rate is
l∞ ≤ nA
(
1− h
(
E
A
))
− n leakEC. (6)
IV. SECURITY VERIFICATION
To verify the security of the secret key, we compare the
experimental result with the bound of the secret key un-
der the asymptotic assumption and finite-key-size analy-
sis. For the asymptotic case, we use Eq. (6) as the secure
key bound. For finite-key-size effect, we use a numer-
ical optimization to find a combination of security pa-
rameters (εPE, ε˜, εPA, and εEC) that maximizes the key
length in Eq. (5). The observed error rate E is an aver-
age of the error rates reported by the system after each
key distillation at a given transmission loss. The term
A is calculated assuming the Poisson distribution with a
mean photon number per pulse µ = 0.2 sent by Alice.
The value of µ varied between 0.2–0.4 in the experiment,
however the lowest value gives the highest bound for the
secret key rate. We thus obtain bounds of secure key
length, plotted in Fig. 2. Above each curve lies the zone
where the security of the key is not covered by finite-key-
size analysis.
The experimental secret key sizes, denoted by black ×,
always satisfy the security criteria for the asymptotic as-
sumption. When the size of the input sifted key is large,
the key-rate bounds with and without finite-size assump-
tion lie very close to each other (see Fig. 2). This might
put the experimentally distilled key size below the finite-
key-size bound, i.e., on the safe side. However, when
the sifted key size is reduced, the key-rate bounds with
and without finite-key assumption diverge significantly.
Higher loss results in higher divergence. A fraction of the
experimental results falls outside the secure zone for the
finite-key-size analysis with values of ε up to 10−1. The
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FIG. 3. Experimental result with new software. The line loss
was 3 dB and error rate was 1%. Blue (dark grey) curve is
the asymptotic key bound given by Eq. (6). Red (grey) curve
is the finite-key-size bound for ε = 10−10 given by Eq. (5). A
group of × presents results of 8 key distillations.
latter value means there is a 10% chance that the infor-
mation of the key generated under this condition might
be leaked to Eve. In practice, the security parameter ε
can be picked to be of the same order as the probability
of major natural disasters such as a serious earthquake,
nearby volcanic eruption or nuclear power plant melt-
down [25]. If such disaster happened, it is most likely
that the security of the key would not matter anymore.
For example, the probability of a nuclear power plant
meltdown is 10−4 per year, according to the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission [26]. If our QKD machine generates
two keys every minute or approximately 106 keys a year,
one might pick ε = 10−10 so that the probability that at
least one key leaks to Eve is of the same order as such
disasters [25]. However, our experiment shows that Eve
can consistently induce a much higher risk probability of
key leakage. She can do this by applying our channel
interruption technique for BB84 protocol at channel loss
values > 2 dB (or line distances longer than about 12 km,
given typical fiber loss value of 0.17 dB/km).
V. TESTING MANUFACTURER’S PATCH
In the middle of our study in 2014, ID Quantique re-
leased a software update for Clavis2. After the update,
the system accumulates the raw key over multiple key ex-
change sessions, and performs post-processing only when
the sifted-key size reaches a threshold of about 2 Mbit.
We have repeated our experiment and recalculated our
plot using the new parameters acquired from the updated
system. The result shows that the secret key is within
the secure bound of ε = 10−10 (see Fig. 3). Regardless of
our channel interruptions, we observed that the system
has retained the raw key exchanged before termination of
each raw-key exchange session, and accumulated it until
the size reached about 2 Mbit before proceeding to the
5distillation. This behavior is clearly visible in the system
log and confirmed by the manufacturer [20].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have done a security evaluation of
the finite-key-size effect for Clavis2 system that included
derivation of the specific key-rate equation, developing a
testing methodology, using it to test the system’s secu-
rity against finite-key-size effects, and testing the manu-
facturer’s patch. Although rigorous security proofs with
finite-key-size assumptions were abundant in the litera-
ture during the start of this work, they were not assem-
bled together into a key-rate equation suitable for the
system under test. Our work has assembled the compo-
nents of the key-rate equation, verified the assumptions,
and put them together into the form of Eq. (5). How-
ever, under our assumptions, the equation does not give
the upper bound to evaluate the security of the secret key.
Using our result, we can only verify that the keys that
fall above the bound are not secure under finite-key-size
analysis.
We have shown that by dynamically controlling the
channel loss, Eve can force the system to distill key from
a shorter sifted-key length to bring the finite-key-effects
into play. Using our derived key-rate equation, Eq. (5),
we have shown that key distilled from a sufficiently small
length of sifted-key is not guaranteed to be secure, even
with the manufacturer’s added post-processing step of
secret-key subtraction. We have also investigated the
security update from ID Quantique, and found that all
experimental results fall under the bound in this study.
Unfortunately the security of the key against this attack
cannot be concluded from this result. Our study only
covers statistical evidence from the system against a the-
oretical bound. An explicit attack that exploits this effect
is still open for future study.
Our investigation highlights the significance and im-
portance of finite-key-size analysis in the implementa-
tions of QKD, especially in commercial systems. Our
method of attack can be used as basis of a testing
methodology for security certification. It should be in-
corporated in the standardization of QKD, which is the
next step this technology field faces [27].
We responsibly disclosed to ID Quantique partial re-
sults of this investigation before the 2014 patch. Pub-
lication has been delayed in order to give the company
enough time for patch deployment.
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